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By the rude bridge that arched the flood,
Their flag to April's breeze unfurled,
Here once the embattled farmers stood, 1
And fired the shot heard round the world.

Since its 1975 invasion of the ex-Portuguese colony of East Timor, 2 the Indonesian government
has been involved in a low-intensity conflict with
the East Timorese Liberation Front, Freitilin. In a
struggle characterized by occasional ambushes of
government patrols and reprisals, the likelihood
of escalation beyond this little-known, little-cared
3
about backwater seemed a remote possibility.
Beginning in early 1997, however, Indonesians
operating Internet websites noticed seemingly arbitrary intrusions into file servers followed by the
appearance of statements in support of East
Timorese independence. 4 Primary targets appeared to be the Indonesian Armed Forces
("ABRI"), government ministries, the National Institute of Sciences and state-run universities.
While no permanent damage resulted from these
attacks, the ABRI launched what were described
as "counter operations in the war of propaganda
on the Internet '' 5 and attacked the intruders Internet homepages. These "counter operations"
were not directed against Indonesian citizens
under the jurisdiction of the Indonesian government but against a group of hackers in Portugal. 6

Intrusions were subsequently reported at the
ABRI and Department of Foreign Affairs websites,
the government computer system, the Indonesian
Institute of Studies, and the Surabaya Institute of
7
Technology.
Beginning August 1, 1998, and continuing for
the next 48 hours, the implications of acting
against the Portuguese hackers became clear to
the Indonesian authorities. The Portuguese
hacker group "KaotiK Team"8 eventually defaced
forty-five websites belonging to the government,
Indonesian-based international organizations, private industry and Indonesian Internet service
providers.9 KaotiK Team, a group dedicated to
fighting for East Timorese liberation, pledged to
continue operations until Indonesia's occupation
of East Timor ends) 0 A new dimension of conflict had arrived in Indonesia and literally, the
shot was heard around the world.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The development of the Internet as a form of
mass media has resulted in a debate among the
federal government's law enforcement, intelligence and defense communities concerning the
extent of vulnerability of the National Informa-
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tion Infrastructure ("Nil")1" to an incident such
as the August 1998 attack on Indonesian websites.
In response to these concerns, the Acquisition
and Technology Policy Center of the RAND Corporation's National Defense Research Institute, 12
in conjunction with the National Defense University, 1 3 conducted a study for the Office of the As-

sistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence in early
1995.14 The study and its results, constituted one
of the first gatherings of defense, intelligence, law
enforcement, academia and industry personnel to
identify emerging topics specifically related to the
16
vulnerability 15 of the NII.
The object of the study was to assess the decision making process during a major hypothetical
"information warfare" attack launched against the
United States during a crisis in the Persian Gulf
region.' 7 Based upon the RAND Corporation's
projected trends in the world's geopolitical ball1 See U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment,
Information Security and Privacy Network Environments (1994),
quoted in Greg Rattray, The Emerging Global Information Infrastructure and National Security, 21:2 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF.
81 (1997) (describing information infrastructures as networks of computer hardware and software, data storage and
generating equipment, abstract information and its applications, trained personnel and interconnections between all
these components through the public-switched telephone
network, satellite and wireless networks, private networks and
the Internet).
12
The Acquisition and Technology Policy Center of the
RAND Corporation's National Defense Research Institute is a

federally funded research and development center. See
RAND Corporation (visited Nov. 11, 1998) <http://
www.rand.org>. Its primary role is to improve public policy
through independent research and analysis. See id.
13 The mission of the National Defense University is to
serve as the post-graduate center for military education for
the armed forces and to provide research to support national
security objectives. See NationalDefense University (visited Nov.
11, 1998) <http://www.ndu.edu>.
14
See Roger C. Molander et al., Strategic Information Warfare: A New Face of War iii, 8 (National Defense Research Institute, Rand Corporation, 1996).
15
See REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

PROTECTION: -CRITICAL FOUNDATIONS

-

PROTECTING AMERICA'S INFRASTRUCTURES B-3 (1997) (hereinafter PCCIP REPORT) (defining vulnerability as a characteristic of a critical infrastructure's design, implementation, or
operation of that renders it susceptible to destruction or incapacitation by a threat).
16 See Molander, supra note 14, at 8-9 (stating that participants represented industry, academia, the analytic and research communities, the intelligence community, national security policy-makers, and the military services at the levels of
Chief Executive Officer, Two- and Four-star military officers
and assistant secretary-level civilian employees in the U.S.
government).
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ance of power, the exercise's scenario was based
upon a fictitious split between members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
("OPEC") over levels of oil production. 18 Simul-

taneous with the study's fictitious disruption in relations, simulated infrastructure breakdowns occurred in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United
States. 19 Reports that the banking system of the
United Kingdom was compromised by hacking resulted in a sharp drop in worldwide stock markets
as investors feared that fund transfer systems were
compromised were also added to the simulation's
fact pattern.2 0 This drop, combined with massive
increases in the price of oil, resulted in a looming
worldwide economic collapse. 21

In addition, a

successful disinformation campaign led to media
reports that the United States government was on
the brink of an aggressive and unprovoked war in
the Persian Gulf Region. 22 Evidence was
presented to the participants suggesting that
17 The RAND Corporation described the hypothetical
fact pattern for a Persian Gulf Major Regional ContingencyType Crisis as:
Iran seeks hegemony over the Persian Gulf region (circa
2000) by the overthrow of the Saudi Kingdom through a
coup by dissidents in Saudi Arabia. A major military crisis develops in the region with a decision by the United
States to deploy forces as a deterrent maneuver. Iran
and its Saudi domestic 'ally' conduct information warfare attacks on the Saudi government and the U.S. government.
See id. at 6.
18 See id. at 64. (stating that during a May 4, 2000, OPEC
meeting in Caracas, Iran, Iraq, Libya and Algeria promote a
major cutback in production with a goal of driving the price
to at least $60 (FY-95 dollars) a barrel); see generally DANIEL
YERGIN, THE PRIZE: THE EPIC QUEST FOR OIL, MONEY AND
POWER 519-27 (1991) (describing OPEC membership and
goals).
19 See Molander, supra note 14, at 64-65 (describing a loss
of power in Cairo for several hours; massive failures in the
public switched telephone network in Northern California
and Oregon; a mass-dialing attack on Fort Lewis, Washington; a malfunction leading to a large explosion and fire at
the largest Arabian-American Oil Company refinery near
Dhahran, Saudi Arabia; and a high-speed train collision in
Maryland).
20
See id. at 66, 74, 78 (describing malfunctions at automatic tellers in Georgia and wild fluctuations at the Chicago
Commodity Exchange bring widespread suspicion that "the
Exchange was being subjected to a powerful form of electronic manipulation by parties unknown").
21
See id. at 78 (stating that at the close of the spot oil
market the price for crude oil topped $100 a barrel).
22
See id. at 79 (describing the initiation of a information
warfare campaign by the 'Action Arm of the Committee for
Planetary Peace' with a call for widespread civil disobedience
to thwart an Administration that had, "lost touch with domestic and international reality").
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these incidents were the result of coordinated attacks on critical Nil components23 in support of a
24
coup attempt in Saudi Arabia backed by Iran.
The study's participants found that American
and Allied military responses to the Persian Gulf
situation were sharply degraded in effectiveness
by the loss of critical NII support overseas 2 5 and
26
massive civil disobedience in the United States.
The exercise highlighted the serious vulnerability
of the NII to organized attacks, thereby undermining the United States' ability to protect vital
national interests and its allies. 27 The participants
determined that any such attack on the NII would
hinder the ability of the United States to act decisively in the event of a similar crisis in the future. 28 Their findings emphasized the need for
changes in planning against threats to the NII, especially regarding the development of information warfare 29 capabilities by organizations or foreign nations in the future. In particular, the
report suggested that current assumptions of secure communications in the United States were
misplaced because of the increasing reliance
upon Internet-based infrastructures for planning,
30
logistics and research and development.
Since the RAND study's publication, the federal
government has launched several initiatives to ad-

dress the report's conclusions. This Comment defines the elements that are critical to the NII and
how they are vulnerable to disruption through
computer-based means. Next, this Comment evaluates the federal government's efforts at addressing NII vulnerabilities, the findings of the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure
Protection ("PCCIP") and the measures taken in
response to the PCCIP Report by Presidential Decision Directives 62 and 63. Additionally, this
Comment analyzes the current statutes relevant to
NII protection and the jurisdictional mandates of
selected government agencies implicated by such
statutes. Finally, this Comment analyzes possible
alternatives for protecting the NII based upon
past government experience and the PCCIP report.

23
See id. at 66 (stating that the Iranian Ambassador to
the UN is overheard to state that the United States was highly
vulnerable to attacks by states and others who had mastered
contemporary computer and telecommunications technology).
24
See id. at 74, 76. (describing the mobilization of six
Iranian armored and mechanized divisions and coup attempts in Dhahran and Mecca, Saudi Arabia).
25
See id. at 77 (stating that the Secretary of Defense is
informed by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff that a information warfare attack was then underway at almost every military base in the United States and Europe involved in the
deployment to the Persian Gulf).
26
See id. at 77 (describing hypothetical efforts by the
Coast Guard and local police to break up a flotilla of boats
attempting to "blockade" the sealift ship U.S.S. Bob Hope from
sailing to the Persian Gulf from Savannah, Georgia).
27
See id. at 41-42 (describing the findings of the study's
participants).
28
See id.
See Todd A. Morth, Note, ConsideringOur Position: View29
ing Information Warfare as a Use of Force Prohibitedby Article 2(4)
of the U.N. Charter,30 CASE. W. REs.J. INT'L L. 567, 571 (1998)
(defining information warfare as "a state activity which has an
incapacitating effect on the ability of the owners of any information network to use or manage that network. This includes, but is not limited to, telecommunications, electrical
power systems, gas and oil storage, transportation, banking
and finance, military forces, and emergency services"); see
also Robert G. Hanseman, The Realities and Legalities of Infor-

mation Warfare, 42 A.F. L. REv. 173, 176 (1998) (stating the
U.S. Air Force's definition of information warfare in the context of offensive and defensive operations).
30
At the conclusion of the exercise, the RAND study
provided four major recommendations for addressing shortcomings in the protection of the NII. First, participants
agreed that there should be a focal office within the federal
government for detecting and monitoring threats to the NII
at the level of the Office of the President because of the need
for coordination of a large number of organizations at the
federal, state and local levels of government and in private
industry. Second, the federal government should embark on
a risk assessment to identify potential areas of risk to the NII
and develop methods to counter those threats due to the dynamic and constantly evolving environment of cyberspace
threats and vulnerabilities. Third, the government's role in
defending and protecting against threats to the NII must be
well defined. The primary role advocated was maintenance
of critical NII systems, promoting policies among private industry to reduce vulnerability and iniproving recovery capabilities in the event of attack. Fourth, the vulnerability of the
NII needs to be addressed as a national security concern
rather than simply a public policy issue because of the high
probability that the sources of disruption would in many
cases originate from overseas sources. See Molander, supra
note 14, at xvii-xxi.
31
See HENRY H. PERTrr JR., LAW AND THE INFORMATION
SUPERHIGHWAY §1.2 (1996) (defining the types of computers
comprising information infrastructures as "clients" with
which users interact directly and "servers" which store and

II.

THE NATIONAL INFORMATION
INFRASTRUCTURE AND ITS
VULNERABILITIES

A.

Critical Infrastructures
Information infrastructures consist of networks

of computers,3

1

data storage and generating

equipment, administrators and the interconnec-
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tions32 between these components. 3 3 In support
of these building blocks of information infrastructures are public switched telephone networks
("PSTN"), satellite communications networks, private networks and the Internet. 34 Through the

creation of such information infrastructures, large
amounts of data can be transferred to several locations simultaneously, increasing the ability of all
users to communicate more efficiently. Beginning
in the early 1990's, the rapid commercialization
of the Internet 5 resulted in the expansion of the

use of such infrastructures and eventually, the cre36
ation of the NII.
Today, many major industries, particularly
those in the telecommunications and energy areas, have utilized the NII to accelerate the quality,
quantity and efficiency of the services which they
provide. 37 Technological advances facilitated by
the NII have yielded improved services at lower
costs, opened up new markets for goods and services and accelerated the flow of new ideas. As a
result, however, the dependence on these technologies has increased and eliminated the redundancy which gave their predecessors resilience
should failure occur. 38 A large portion of the NII

depends upon the use of the public switched telephone network and the Internet for the transfer
of information.3 9 This network depends on electricity, computer operated systems, telephone
process information for large numbers of client computers).
32
See id. (stating that when the Internet is accessed, client computers access servers owned by the organizations with
which they wish to communicate through requests routed to
the server by the client).
33 See Rattray, supra note 11, at 82.
34 See id. at 83.
35
The Internet was created as a communications tool for
use by the United States government and private institutions
conducting military research in the late 1960s. By linking
many computers together, a decentralized system of computers was created to withstand a nuclear attack by dispersing
data to multiple locations, some of which would survive the
attack. Also, the Internet allows messages to reach their destinations through many different routes. Thus, if some computers were destroyed, communication remained possible
among the surviving locations. See Sean Selin, Governing Cyberspace: The Need for an lnternational Solution, 32 GONZ L. REv.
365, 367 (1997); see also Reno v. American Civil Liberties
Union, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2334 (1997) (describing the development of the Internet).
36 See Vice President Albert Gore, Address to the International Telecommunications Union Development Conference, Buenos Aires, Argentina (Mar. 21, 1994) (stating that
the U.S. NII consists of hundreds of different networks, run
by different technologies, all connected together in a giant
network of networks), quoted in Rattray, supra note 11, at 82.
37 See PCCIP REPORT, supra note 15, at 10. The PCCIP
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lines, and fiber optic cables to facilitate communications. The increasing demand by public and
private organizations for information also ensures
that the number of access points will rapidly increase with time. 40 The fundamental issue facing
the government today is how to effectively maintain the Nil while preventing individuals or organizations which seek to disrupt these activities
from penetrating critical components of infrastructure.
This increasing dependence on information infrastructures is not merely a private sector phenomenon. The NII is integral to the operation of
practically all vital defense and public service
functions performed at every level of government.
Specifically, five areas were identified by the PCCIP as "critical" components of the NIl. These areas are telecommunications, transportation, vital
human services, energy, and banking and finance. 4 1 Significant disruption in any of these areas is of primary concern when discussing the
threats to the NII today.
B.

Threats to the NII's Critical Components

Traditionally, threats to the stability of government infrastructures have arisen in the form of
physical attacks42 against key sites by terrorist
groups or through actions by foreign nations
stated that NII dependence has grown because: "Organizations have harnessed information technology to accelerate
their delivery of goods and services, tighten the efficiency of
their processes, and shed excess inventory and unused reserve capacity. Many businesses are so tightly balanced in
their just-in-time' processes that recovery from even a minor
disruption would prove difficult." See id.
38
CyberAttack: Is the Nation At Risk?, HearingBefore the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 1 05th Cong. (June 24,
1998), (Testimony of George J. Talent, Director, Central Intelligence Agency) (stating "...we have staked our way of life
on the use of information. We rely more and more on computer networks for the flow of essential information... reliability breeds dependence - and dependence produces vulnerabilities ....

Disruptions in information-based

technologies can range from being a serious nuisance... to
potentially disastrous.").
39 See Rattray, supra note 11, at 83 (stating that the vast
majority of transactions and information flows "rely on the
vulnerable public switched network for transmission by
landline, microwave or satellite means").
40 See The National Information Infrastructure: Agenda
for Action, 58 Fed. Reg. 49,025 (1993) (stating that the government has a duty to ensure that all Americans have access
to the resources and job potential of the Information Age).
41
See PCCIP REPORT, supra note 15, at A-1.
42
See id. at B-3 (describing physical security as action
"taken for the purpose of restricting or limiting unauthor-
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which threaten national interests. Today, while
these conventional forms of action continue to occur,4 3 new types of "threats" have arisen in conjunction with increased reliance on the Nil.
These threats include foreign and domestic entities (e.g., an individual, organization or nation)
possessing both the capability44 to exploit a weakness in a critical infrastructure 45 and the malicious intent4 6 of debilitating defense or economic
security. 47 Such entities initiate attacks48 with the
goal of destroying, 49 incapacitating 50 or debilitating 51 Nil systems to accomplish the tasks assigned
to them. Due to the diverse nature of the components of the NII, the individual characteristics
that make them vulnerable to attack should be explored.
1.

ture includes the PSTN, the Internet and the millions of computers for personal, commercial and
governmental use. Prior to the widespread introduction of cellular service in the 1980's, 5 2 the

landline telephone system provided virtually all
telecommunications service. 5 3 This system of fi-

ber optic and copper cables comprises the back54
bone of the telecommunications infrastructure.
The PSTN is primarily operated by softwaredriven switching systems which automatically connect and disconnect users at all points of the system. 55 The Internet relies upon the PSTN to fa-

cilitate data transport between remote users by
56
breaking messages into small packets of data.
This data is sent from relay point to relay point
over different paths to its destination where it is
reassembled upon arrival. 57 The lack of direct

connection leaves the system vulnerable at inter-

Telecommunications

mediate points.

58

The expansion of the information and communications infrastructure in the United States has
led to radical changes in the way government and
economy communicate. This critical infrastruc-

Threats to the telecommunications infrastructure can come from physical or cyberspace 59 attacks at many points in the process.6 0 Physical
attacks, the traditional threat to the telecommuni-

ized access, specifically, reducing the probability that a threat
will succeed in exploiting critical infrastructure vulnerabilities including protection against direct physical attacks, e.g.
through use of conventional or unconventional weapons").

See id. at B-2. (defining incapacitation as "an abnor50
mal condition when the level of products and services a critical infrastructure provides its customers is reduced. While
typically a temporary condition, an infrastructure is considered incapacitated when the duration of reduced performance causes a debilitating impact.").
See id. at B-1 (defining debilitated as "a condition of
51
defense or economic security characterized by ineffectualness").

43

See generally The New Terrorism, THE

ECONOMIST,

Aug.

15-21, 1998, at 17-19 (describing current trends in terrorism
in light of the Aug. 7, 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in
Tanzania and Kenya).
44
See PCCIP Report, supra note 15, at B-i (describing
capability as "the ability of a suitability organized, trained,
and equipped entity to access, penetrate, or alter government or privately owned information or communications systems and/or to disrupt, deny or destroy part of a critical infrastructure").
45
See id. at B-i (defining critical infrastructures as "infrastructures which are so vital that their incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitation effect on defense or economic security").
46 See id. at B-3 (describing intent as "demonstrating a deliberate series of actions with the objective of debilitating defense or economic security by destroying or incapacitating a
critical infrastructure").
47 See id. at B-2 (describing economic security as "the
confidence that the nation's goods and services can successfully compete in global markets while maintaining or boosting real incomes of its citizens").
48 See id. at B-i (describing an attack as "a discrete malicious action of debilitating intent inflicted by one entity
upon another. A threat might attack a critical infrastructure
to destroy or incapacitate it").
49 See id. at B-1. (defining destruction as "a condition
when the ability of a critical infrastructure to provide its customers an expected level of products and services is negated.
Typically a permanent condition. An infrastructure is considered destroyed when its level of performance is zero.").

52

See ALAN

STONE, How AMERICA GOT ON-LINE: POLITICS,

MARKETS, AND THE REVOLUTION IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS

141

(1997) (describing the expansion of cellular and satellite service in the 1980's).
53
See Ralph J. Andreotta, The National Information Infrastructure:Its Implications, Opportunities, and Challenges, 30 WAKE
FOREST L. REv. 221, 224 (1995).
54
See generally, STONE, supra note 52, at 143-48.
55 See id.
56
See id., at 185-86 (describing the operation of the Internet through the use of different sites to send parts of a
single message or packet of data).
57

58

See id.
See PCCIP

REPORT,

supra note 15, at A-5 (describing

vulnerabilities associated with a connectionless data packet
network).
See Reno, 117 S.Ct. at 2334-35 (1997) (stating that
59
"cyberspace" consists of methods that transmit text, sound,
pictures and video images via e-mail, chat rooms and sites on
the World Wide Web that, while located in no particular location, can be accessed by anyone with access to the Internet
with anominity).
See generally PCCIP REPORT, supra note 15, at A-4-A-7
60
(discussing vulnerabilities to the NIl in the areas of PSTN
switching, transport of data, signalling between intermediate
data transfer points, and control and management of data).
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cations system and beyond the scope of this
work, 6 1 remain a continuing threat to the industry. Cyber-based threats, on the other hand, have
increased as the volume of use and complexity of
the system has grown. 6 2 System reliability has,
however, remained high because of cooperation
between the Federal Communications Commis63
sion and service providers.
Deliberate attacks designed to steal, modify or
destroy data have increasingly emerged as threats
to the viability of the systems as it presently ex64
ists.
Insiders constitute the largest known
source of security threat to the telecommunications systems using cyberspace methods of attack. 65 However, equally troublesome to the telecommunications industry is the threat of well
organized outside attacks by national intelligence
organizations, military information warfare
67
units, 6 6 criminals, and industrial competitors.
Attacks may come in the form of destruction, al-

teration, remote unauthorized control or the shut
down communications systems. 68 This situation is
intensified by deregulation of the telecommunica-

61
See Sean P. Kanuck, Information Warfare: New Challenges
for Public International Law, 37 HARV. INT'L LJ. 272, 289
(1996) (dividing the potential threats to the NII into two
clearly definable spheres - those which are physical in nature
and those which are electronic or "cyber" based).
62
See id. at 283-84 (explaining how the increased dependence on information technology by society has increased
the need to attack a nation's NII in future international conflicts).
63
See generally ROBERT L. HILLIARD, THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION: A PRIMER, 48-58 (1991) (detailing the

we are not alone in developing information warfare
weapons. Other nations are not only watching our actions, but developing their own doctrines and contingencies as well. Americans may take some comfort from
our current lead in advanced computer chip production, but other nations are close behind... Other countries can take advantage of much of the information
revolution that the United States has invested heavily in,
without bearing any of the costs.
See INST. FOR NAT'L STRATEGIC STUDIES, STRATEGIC ASSESS-

activities of the Federal Communication Commission's Com-

quoted in Hanseman, supra note 29, at 190-91
67
See James Adams, THE NEXT WORLD WAR, 259-62
(1998) (describing efforts by French intelligence agencies to
gain access to U.S. industrial secrets during the early 1990's).
68 See Andreotta, supra note 53, at 223-24 (stating that the
private sector will continue to be responsible for leading future development of the NII through competitive environments and that hundreds of companies of all sizes must strive
to satisfy the vast and varying array of consumer wants and
needs).
69
See generally The Telecommunications Act of 1996,
Pub.L.No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (deregulating telecommunications services).
70
See In re: Implementation of Local Competition provisions in The Telecommunications Act of 1996, First Report
and Order 11 F.C.C.R. 15499 (1996) (stating that the three
principal goals of the 1996 Act are the opening of local exchange and local access markets to competition, promoting
increased competition in all telecommunications markets
and preserving universal service during the transition to
open competition).
71
See id.
72
See STONE, supra note 52, at 188-89 (describing the development of the World Wide Web and the increased accessibility to information which has resulted from its widespread
use).
73
See ADAMS, supra note 67, at 189-90.

mon Carrier and Field Operations Bureaus in conjunction
with service providers to maintain reliability of the PSTN).
64 There are many realistic threats to the information infrastructures, including malicious insiders, and intruders, terrorists, saboteurs, and incompetent administrative and operational staff, in addition to effects of the environment, natural
phenomena, accidental interference, and so on. These
threats may come from corporate, national, or terrorist interests as well as individuals. The list of threats is long and mul-

tidimensional. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING

OFFICE,

Information

Security: Computer Attacks at Department of Defense Pose
Increasing Risks, Rep. No. GAO/AIMD-96-84, at 12-14

(1996); see

also

GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,

Information

Security: Computer Attacks at Department of Defense Pose
Increasing Risks, Testimony Before The Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Rep. No. GAO/T-AIMD-96-92, at 2 (1996) (Statement of Jack L. Brock, Jr., Director, General Accounting
Office Defense Information and Financial Management Systems, Accounting and Information Management Division).
65
See generally, PCCIP REPORT, supra note 15, at A-4 (stating that insiders with access to networks currently constitute
the largest known security threat to the NII).
66 Development and research on effective information
warfare capabilities is not limited to the United States military. Based upon available information from non-classified
sources it an readily be determined that:

tions industry, 69 resulting in the expansion of access points, 70 increasing reliance upon automated
systems to reduce costs 7' and easier access to sensitive data and functions comprise the backbone
of the system. 72 With network elements increasingly reliant upon each other, attacks simultane-

ously targeting multiple sites and functions are
highly difficult to defend against, particularly if
they coincide with physical destruction of supporting systems in the telecommunications infra73
structure.
2.

Transportation

The transportation infrastructure in the United
States consists of the vast network of highways,
railroads, pipelines, ports and inland waterways,

MENT

1995 - U.S. SECURITY

CHALLENGES IN TRANSITION,

(1994)
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airports, and air traffic control systems which the
nation relies upon to facilitate the efficient move-

ment of goods, services and people on both domestic and international routes.74 Assurance of
the continued viability of this system is critical to
the continued health of the economy and national security, particularly in the areas of air traffic control, 75 ports and waterway safety, 7 6 and the
Global Positioning System. 7 7 These elements of
the transportation system, previously reliant primarily on non-electronic methods of operation,
have become increasingly dependent on computer-controlled systems.7 8 The continued consolidation of the transportation industry in sectors
such as air transport, railroads, seaborne transport and trucking has reduced the number of
routes used by the transportation industry
through the consolidation of distribution centers,
compounding redundancy deficiencies in the
event of failure of a critical component. 79 The increasing congestion at selected points in the transportation system also results in pressure on govTransportation is defined by the PCCIP as
A critical infrastructure characterized by the physical distribution system critical to supporting the national security and economic well-being of this nation, including the
national airspace system, airlines and aircraft, and airports; roads and highways, trucking and personal vehicles; ports and waterways and the vessels operating
thereon; mass transit, both rail and bus; pipelines, including gas, petroleum, and other hazardous materials;
freight and long haul passenger rail; and delivery services.
See PCCIP REPORT, supra note 67, at B-3.
75 See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AIR TRAFFIC CON74

TROL: WEAK COMPUTER SECURITY PRACTICES JEPORDIZE FLIGHT
SAFETY, Rep. No. GAO/AIMD-98-155, at 2 (1998) (hereinaf-

ter "Rep. No. GAO/AIMD-98-155") (describing the ineffectiveness of Federal Aviation Administration security for information systems and stating that it was in violation of its own
policy during a review conducted for the FAA's Office of Civil
Aviation in October, 1996 because it had performed the necessary analysis to determine threats, vulnerabilities and safeguards for only 3 of 90 operational air traffic control computer systems, less then four percent).
76
See generally Keeping All Channels Open, THE ECONOMIST,
Sept. 12-18, 1998, at 28-29 (describing the missions of the
U.S. Coast Guard and its roles in law enforcement and administrative law).
77 See Global Positioning System (visited Nov. 11, 1998)
<http://www.msl.jpl.nasa.gov/Programs/gps.html> (describing the operation of the 24 satellites which make up this navigation system).
78
See PCCIP Report, supra note, 15 at A-12 (1997).
79 See id.
80 Attention must be paid to air traffic control systems
when discussing Nil security. This federally run system is currently undergoing modernization, resulting in increased reli-

ernment systems, particularly those connected to
the air traffic control system.8 0 Additionally,
there is a marked absence of security assurance
against attacks on the NII systems upon which the
transportation infrastructure depends."' This
congestion and lack of security, combined with a
general lack of awareness sharply limits the government's ability to counter even a limited NI
disruption in the transportation industry.
3.

Vital Human Services

Vital human services provided by government
entities consist of three critical NII components:
(1) water supply; 2 (2) emergency services;8 3 and
(3) government services.8

4

Unlike other Nil com-

ponents, the majority of these services are maintained at the state and local levels and are primarily concerned with basic human needs and
safety.8 5 This highly decentralized system of con-

trols raises the possibility that failures would be localized to a specific geographical area should they
ance on the exchange of information from remotely located
parts of the system. See id. Current systems are primarily self
contained, based upon voice communications and physical
handoffs of aircraft between communications centers avoid
problems connected with disruption if the NII. See id. Future plans, however, call for the Global Positioning System of
satellites to become the nation's sole radionavigation system
by 2010, leading to exclusive reliance on a satellite-based system to control air traffic. This reliance raises the potential for
disruptions at a single point in the air traffic control system
to effect the entire system. See Ed Hazelwood, Air Traffic Con-

trol Outlook: FAA Considers Backup for GPS, 148:5
WEEK & SPACE TECH. 58

81

AVIATION

(1998).

See Rep. No. GAO/AIMD-98-155, supra note 75, at 11
See PCCIP REPORT supra note 15, at B-4 (defining water
supply systems as "a critical infrastructure characterized by
the sources of water, reservoirs and holding facilities, aqueducts and other transport systems, the pipelines, the cooling
systems and other delivery mechanisms that provide for domestic and industrial applications, including systems for dealing with water runoff, waste water, and fire-fighting.").
83
See id. (defining emergency services as "critical infrastructure characterized by medical, police, fire, and rescue
systems and personnel that are called upon when an individual or community is responding to emergencies. These services are typically provided at [the county or metropolitan
area] level. In addition, state and Federal response plans define emergency support functions to assist in response and
recovery").
84
See id. at B-2 (defining government services as "sufficient capabilities at the Federal, state and local levels of government are required to meet the needs for essential services
to the public").
85
See id. at A-44 (describing the differences between vital
human services infrastructures and other critical infrastructures).
82
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occur. 86 However, a loss of confidence in the gov-

ernment's ability to maintain these systems in
times of crisis and the possible interstate effects of
failure necessitates their inclusion in the NI as
critical infrastructures.

87
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wide systems for coordination of supplies, the centralization of previously dispersed control systems
and dependence on the use of the PSTN raise the
possibility that the breakdown of one system due
to attack could disrupt service throughout the en94
tire energy distribution infrastructure.

4. Energy
5. Banking and Finance
All information infrastructures depend on the
availability of energy to operate. Of particular
concern when discussing energy and the NiI is
88
the vulnerability of electric power systems, oil
and gas refining and transmission facilities.8 9
Many private entities providing energy services
are attempting to minimize costs and increase efficiency through the increased use of automation.90 Compromising these control systems could
lead to widespread disruption of services and
physical destruction of equipment vital to recovery efforts. An effective method to facilitate such
a breakdown is to alter or disrupt the information
and control systems used to operate major components of the systems. 9 1 Currently, there is little
awareness within private industry on information
security and the consequences of a compromise
in security of operating systems. 92 This results in
the use of NII based systems to control various aspects of the energy production process from raw
materials production to power generation and refining processes. 93 The increased use of industry86
87

See id.
See generally PCCIP

REPORT,

supra note 15, at A-48-A-53

Banking and finance infrastructures 95 of concern to the NII include banks, financial service
companies, payment systems, investment compa96
nies and securities and commodities exchanges.
The banking and financial sector is the most secure component of the critical NII because theft
prevention mechanisms and systems for recording
transactions ensure its reliability and provide re97
dundancy in the event of unauthorized access.
At the operational level, however, reliance on
non-U.S. information infrastructures for international fund transfers and securities trading, as well
as dependence on the telecommunications and
energy industries to facilitate all financial transfers create vulnerabilities because they allow access to the NIl by parties which may not observe
the same standards of security as those located in
the United States. 98
Furthermore, a reluctance to share information
dealing with cyber attacks and protection methods exists within the industry and between governincreased use of technology by the energy industry to maximize efficiency).

(demonstrating that emergency services rely heavily on com-

91

puter controlled PSTN systems for dispatch of appropriate
first responders, coordination, incident containment and the
emergency 911 system. This results in the possibility that

92

emergency services could be future targets of outside groups
or individuals purposely or indirectly while attacking another
part of the NIl).
88 See PCCIP REPORT, supra note 15, at B-2 (defining elec-

trical power systems as "a critical infrastructure characterized
by generation stations, transmission and distribution networks that create and supply electricity to end-users so that
end-users achieve and maintain normal functionality, including the transportation and storage of fuel essential to that

system").
See id. (defining gas and oil production, storage and
transportation as "a critical infrastructure characterized by
the production and holding facilities for natural gas, crude
and refined petroleum, and petroleum-derived fuels, the refining and processing facilities for these fuels and the pipelines, ships, trucks, and rail systems that transport these commodities from their source to systems that are dependent
upon gas and oil in one of their useful forms").
90 See Karl Rabago, Information Technology: It's Not Just
Business Anymore, 134 FORT. 23, 24-25 (1996) (describing the
89

93
94
95

See PCCIP REPORT, supra note 11, at 12.
See id. at A-29-A-30.
See generally id.
See generally id.

The PCCIP Report describes banking and finance as a

critical infrastructure characterized by:
Entities, such as retail and commercial organizations, investment institutions, exchange boards, trading houses,
and reserve systems, and associated operational organizations, government operations, and support activities,
that are involved in all manner of monetary transactions,

including its investment for income purposes, its exchange for payment purposes and its disbursement in

the form of loans and other financial instruments.
See PCCIP REPORT, supra note 11, at B-1.
96

See generally, Mike Plonien, Electronic Commerce on the In-

ternet, 68 CPA JOURNAL 82 (1998) (describing the various
kinds of electronic commerce available via Internet sources).
97
See The Role of Computer Security in Protecting U.S. Infrastructure: Hearing Before the U.S. House Comm. on Science, Subcommittee on Technology, 1 0 5 1h Cong. 37, 39 (1998) (statement
of Stephen R. Katz, Chief Information Security Officer, Citibank, N.A.).
98 See id.
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ment authorities because of the fear that public
confidence will undermined. 99 Reporting is generally compartmentalized and few trusted methods exist for sharing the kinds of information
needed to make an overall assessment of what the
10 0
result of a coordinated attack would be.
III.
A.

INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
INITIATIVES AND ORGANIZATIONS
National Security Directive No. 42

One of the earliest unclassified documents
describing preparations to protect the NII by the
defense and intelligence communities is National
Security Directive No. 42 ("NSD 42").101 This
document, dated July 5, 1990, "National Policy for
the Security of National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems," established the
initial objectives, policies, and organizational
structures to prevent the compromise of secure
national security systems and disseminate information to affected government agencies.' 0 2 Specifically, NSD 42 created the National Security
Telecommunications and Information Systems Security Committee ("NTISSC"), an inter-agency
policy coordinating committee to oversee imple99 The PCCIP Report defines trust as that:
. . bestowed by citizens based on demonstrations and
expectations of 1) Their government's ability to provide
for their common defense and economic security and
behave consistent with the interests of society; and 2)
Their critical infrastructures' ability to provide products
and services at expected levels and to behave consistent
with their customers' best interests.
See PCCIP REPORT, supra note 11, at B-3
100
See id. at A-40.
101 National Policy for the Security of National Security Tele-

communications and Information Systems, National Security Directive 42,July 5, 1990 (hereinafter "NSD 42") (redacted document released April 1, 1992 in response to Freedom of
Information Act request under DOD case number 90-FOI1584/m).
102
See id. (stating that the directive establishes initial
objectives of policies, and an organizational structure to
guide the conduct of activities to secure national security systems from exploitation; establishes a mechanism for policy
development and dissemination; and assigns responsibilities
for implementation through insuring full participation and
cooperation among the various existing centers of technical
expertise throughout the Executive branch, while recognizing the special requirements for protection of intelligence
sources and methods).
103
The NTISSC was established to consider technical
matters and develop policies, procedures, guidelines, instructions and standards as necessary to implement provisions of
NSD 42. See id.at §5(a). The Committee is chaired by the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Com-

mentation and coordination of various activities

10 3
associated with Nil protection.
At the operational level, the NTISSC oversees
all activities utilizing the NII which affect national
security. 10 4 These roles include: (1) development
of specific operating policies, procedures, guidelines and priorities for implementation of NSD
42;105 (2) presentation of an annual report to the
Executive branch on the status of national security information systems; 10 6 (3) control of the release of cryptography technology to foreign governments or international organizations;' 0 7 and
(4) the maintenance of a national system for
promulgating operational policies, instructions
and guidance pursuant to the goals of NSD 42.108
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command
Control, Communications and Intelligence ("ASD
C;I"), directly subordinate to the Secretary of Defense, is chairperson of the NTISSC and conducts
liaison activities with the intelligence community
through the National Security Council. 109
The Department of Defense seized an early role
in Nil protection activities after it found itself the
target of many of the original unauthorized entry
attempts. 110 The creation of NTISSC provided a
forum for discussion of policy issues relating to

munications and Intelligence and iscomposed of a voting
representatives from the Secretaries of State, Treasury, Defense, Transportation, Energy, the Office of Management
and Budget, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff and each of the armed services, the Federal Bureau
of Investigation; the Federal Emergency Management
Agency, the General Services Administration, National Security Agency, the National Communications System, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Attorney General. See id.
104
See id.
105
See id. at §5(b)(1).
106

See id.at §5(b)(3).

See id.at §5(b)(4).
See id.at §5(b)(5).
109 See generally id.
at §5(d) (stating that the Committee
has a permanent secretariat composed of personnel of the
National Security Agency and other personnel from Executive departments and agencies as requested by the Chairman).
110 See Robert G. Hanseman, The Realities and Legalities of
Information Warfare, 42 A.F. L. REv. 173, 192-93. (stating that
the Defense Information Systems Agency has estimated that
Defense department Computers were attacked at least
250,000 times in1995, that these attacks were successful 65%
of the time, and the number of attacks has been doubling
each year). The Defense Information Infrastructure ("DII")
is "the web of communications networks, computers,
software, databases, applications, weapon system interfaces,
data, security services, and other services that meet the information processing and transport needs of Department of De107
108
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systems that process classified information or information involving intelligence activities, national security and critical military or intelligence
missions. 1 1 Concern over the increasing vulnerability of the overall NII resulted in the ASD C;I
commissioning of the RAND study detailed
above. 112 While this office is primarily concerned
with defense related portions of the NII, the appearance of an expanded threat to the NII due to
increased reliance on information systems, called
for a government-wide assessment of what should
13
be done to assess the situation.
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aspects of Nil policy.1 4 This organization, and an
16
1 5
consisting of thirty-seven'
advisory council
members of the public and private sectors, was
given a mandate to create NII policy. 117 Unlike

NTISSC's emphasis on security, this initiative encouraged job creation, economic growth, increased productivity and improved quality of life
through utilization of the NII.1 18 The NTIA
sought to connect industry, residences, schools,
health care facilities and government agencies
through high-speed links in the NII. 119
The NTIA was established with the recognition

that major parts of the NII would be developed by
B.

Executive Orders No. 12,864 and No. 13,010

Outside of the Department of Defense, the
Clinton Administration established of the National Telecommunications and Information Administration ("NTIA") at the Commerce Department to coordinate non-National Security related
fense ("DOD") users, across the range of military operations." See DEFENSE INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE MASTER
PLAN: OVERVIEW, VERSION 7.0 at 2-1 (1998). The DII encompasses; (1) DOD-wide information systems, and interfaces to
weapons systems; (2) physical facilities; (3) the applications
and data engineering tools that allow users to access, manipulate, organize, and digest information; (4) standards and
protocols that facilitate networks; and (5) people and assets
that provide DII management and operation. See id.
I1I See NSD 42, supra note 102, at §5(b)(1).
112
See supra, note 12 (describing the mission of the
RAND Corporation). See Molander, supra note 14 at 6-9
(describing the RAND Corporation study regarding the vulnerability of the NII to attack).
113

SeeJAMES ADAMS, THE NEXT WORLD WAR 176 (Simon

& Schuster, 1998) ("Whatjolted the administration into action was an exercise carried out for the Secretary of Defense
by the RAND Corporation.... For the first time an administration learned that hacking might be more than just a nuisance to be dealt with by the police. Instead, it learned, it
could pose a potent threat to the national security of the
United States.").
114 On September 15, 1993, the administration released
an "Agenda for Action" for the NIl. It describes the role of
NTIA as promoting the development of the telecommunications and information infrastructure connecting the nation's
businesses, residences, schools health care facilities and public information providers through advanced, interactive,
high-speed networks. See generally The National Information
Infrastructure: Agenda for Action, 58 Fed. Reg. 49,025
(1993); see also generally, NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS and
Information Administration, Office of Telecommunications
and Information Applications, Connecting the Nation: Classrooms, Libraries, and health care Organizations in the Information Age (1996) (hereinafter, "CONNECTING THE NATION")
(describing initiatives to connect educational and health care
organizations to the NII and other activities by NTIA).
115
See The National Information Infrastructure: Agenda
for Action, 58 Fed. Reg. 49,025, 49,035-36 (1993).

the private sector, with the government complementing these efforts.120 These roles were specifi-

cally outlined in both Executive Order 12,864, establishing the advisory council for NTIA12 1 and a
supplementary Federal Register notice entitled
"The National Information Infrastructure:
Agenda for Action."' 22 The initiative recognized
116 See Exec. Order No. 12,890, 59 Fed. Reg. 499 (1993)
(expanding the Executive Committee of NTIA from 25 to 30
members); see also Exec. Order No. 12,921, 59 Fed. Reg.
30,667 (1993) (expanding the Executive Committee of NTIA
to 37 members).
117 The Advisory Council was to advise the Secretary of
Commerce on matters related to the development of the NII.
These issues included:
(1) the appropriate roles of the private and public sectors in developing the NII; (2) a vision for the evolution
of the NII and its public and commercial applications;
(3) the impact of current and proposed regulatory regimes on the evolution of the NII; (4) national strategies
for maximizing the benefits of the NIl, as measured by
job creation, economic growth, increased productivity,
and enhanced quality of life; (5) national strategies for
developing and demonstrating applications in areas
such as electronic commerce, agile manufacturing, lifelong learning, health care, government services and civic
networking; (6) national security, emergency preparedness, system security, and network protection implications; (7) national strategies for maximizing interconnection and interoperability of communications
networks; (8) international issues associated with the
NII; (9) universal access; and (10) privacy, security and
copyright issues.
See Executive Order No. 12,864, 58 Fed. Reg. 48,773 at §2(b)
(hereinafter "Exec. Order No. 12,864").
I18 See generally CONNECTING THE NATION, supranote 114,
at 16-17 (1996) (discussing the programs initiated by NTIA
to assist increased Internet connection).
119 See Exec. Order No. 12,864, supra note 118.
See CONNECTING THE NATION, supra note 119, at 2
120
(emphasizing NTIA's role in connecting public institutions
and the underprivileged, while encouraging public-private
investments).
See CONNECTING THE NATION, supra note 119, at §1.
121
The National Information Infrastructure: Agenda for
122
Action, 58 Fed. Reg. 49,025 (1993).
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that these initiatives would aid the ability of U.S.
firms to compete in the global economy while
eliminating the constraints which had previously
limited growth. 123 Additionally, expanded use of
the NII would improve access to government services and aid in the Administration's Reinventing
12 4
Government initiatives.
Increasing accessibility to the Nil was not the
only issue confronting the agency. Early concerns

12 6
about privacy rights, 1 25 intellectual property

and NII security127 were identified as priority missions to be addressed. Reliability, another matter
incorporated into NTIA's mandate, was addressed
in cooperation with the Federal Communication
Commission's Network Reliability Counci 1 28 and
29

In this role, NTIA was able to encourage the rapid expansion of the NII throughthe NTISSC.'

out the early and mid-1990's, resulting in the NII
in place today.
NTIA's work and the effects of private industry
initiatives in utilizing the NII for the operation of
many critical infrastructures raised has concerns

about NII security. 130 When the NTIA policy state-

ment was released, the primary threat to the NII
was impediments to growth due to the lack of digital and high capacity access services in the
123
See id. (stating that limits on growth of industry previously imposed by geographical location have been eliminated because of increased ability to communicate utilizing
the NII).
124
See id. at 49,029.
125
See generally id. at 49,030 (demonstrating the necessary balance between the private sector's need for access to

secure communications while utilizing the NII and the preservation of the ability of government agencies to investigate
illegal activities); see also id. at 49,029 (mandating that NITA
review encryption technologies to protect the privacy of citizens utilizing the NII).
126
See Exec. Order No. 12,864, supra note 118, at
§2 (b) (10).
127
See id. at §2(b)(6).
128
The Federal Communications Commission's Network
Reliability and Interoperability Council ("the Council") was
chartered in 1996 by the Telecommunications Act of 1996 to
study network reliability, interconnection, emerging technologies and essential communications during emergencies. See
Pub.L.No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 47 U.S.C. §256 (Coordination for interconnectivity). The Council's work builds upon
that completed by its predecessor, the Network Reliability
Council, first organized by the FCC in 1992, to study causes
of service outages and develop recommendations based
upon its findings. The Council is composed of 35 CEO-level
representatives of telecommunications carriers, manufacturers, state regulators and consumers. See generally NETwoRK RELIABILITY AND
NEERING

INTEROPERABILITY

AND

COMMISSION,

TECHNOLOGY,

NRIC

COUNCIL,

FEDERAL

OFFICE OF ENGI-

COMMUNICATIONS

NETWORK INTEROPERABILITY: THE KEY TO

PSTN.' 3 1 By 1995, when RAND and NTISSC
staged the information warfare exercise described
earlier, 13 2 vulnerabilities in the security of the NII
became apparent. Along with these vulnerabilities, came the realization that individuals began
exploiting the expanded access to the NII for
their own purposes. 13 3 While none of these unauthorized entries resulted in more than nominal
damage to any one part of the NII, it became
clear that much more needed to be done to keep
13 4
the Nil secure.
These concerns resulted in Executive Order
No. 13,010.135 Promulgated on July 15, 1996, this
Order established the PCCIP to evaluate the potential threats then existing to the critical components of the NIL.' 3 6 Threats were divided into two
categories: physical and cyber. Physical threats included those using conventional or unconventional weapons to damage components of the NII,
while the "cyber" threats were described as those
emanating from the use of electronic, radio-frequency or computer-based attacks on the information or communications components that control critical infrastructures. 137 In addition, the
PCCIP for the first time brought together members from defense, intelligence, commerce, law
(1997) (describing the activities of the Network
Reliability and Interoperability Council).
129
See NSD 42, supra note 103.
130
See Molander, supra note 14, at 1-3.
131
See 58 Fed. Reg. at 49,029 (stating the need for modernization of the telecommunications infrastructure to accommodate increased use by public and private actors).
132
See supra note 12.
133
See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INFORMATION SECOMPETITION

CURITY: COMPUTER HACKER INFORMATION AVAILABLE ON THE

Rep. No. GAO/T-AIMD-96-108, at 2 (1996) (testimony before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on Governmental Affairs by Jack L. Brock,
Director, Defense Information an Financial Management Systems and Keith A. Rhodes, technical Assistant Director, Office of the Chief Scientist, Accounting and Management Division) (hereinafter "Rep. No. GAO/T-AIMD-96-108")
(describing the reasons which hackers seek unauthorized access and the potential threat to national security posed by
hackers). See Paul Van Slambrouck, Cyber threats: How Serious?
Teenage Hacker's Breach of Pentagon Computer Site Points to Growing Problem of Break-ins and Cyberterrorism, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, March 9, 1998, at 1 (exploring the motivations of
hackers).
134
See generally Henry H. Perritt, et. al., Computer Crimes
Now on the Books: What Do We Do From Here?, 70 TEMP. L. REv.
1199 (1997).
135
See Exec. Order No. 13,010, 61 Fed. Reg. 37,347
(1996).
136 See id.
137 See id.; see also PCCIP REPORT, supra note 15, at 18.
INTERNET,
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enforcement and private industry to discuss NII
protection policy.'

38

Previous efforts to define

and shape the NII had been divided exclusively
into civilian and military areas.13 9 Increased commonality between uses of the NII and shared dependence on its attributes prompted a change in
policy and increased cooperation at all levels by
the summer of 1995.140
The PCCIP was charged with the mission of defining issues important to NII protection'

41

and

consulting with areas of the public and private
sectors interested in NII assurance issues. 142 The
group would also assume a lead role in the coordi143
nation of actions of infrastructure protection
efforts during its policy development phase. Because of need to increase coordination between
the then existing infrastructure protection efforts
(centered in the NTISSC and NTIA), Executive
Order 13,010 created the Infrastructure Protection Task Force ("IPTF") within the Federal Bureau of Investigation 14 4 and overseen by PCCIP. 145

The IPTF's interim coordination mission prior
to the final PCCIP report was to provide, facilitate
and coordinate the provision of expert guidance
to critical infrastructures within the NII to halt or
confine an attack while working to restore any
services affected. 146 Also, the IPTF was provided

that authority to facilitate any criminal investigation resulting from attacks on the NII and have
138
The head of each agency of the following executive
branch departments and agencies nominated two full-time
members of the Commission: (i) Department of the Treasury; (ii) Department ofJustice; (iii) Department of Defense;
(iv) Department of Commerce; (v) Department of Transportation; (vi) Department of Energy; (vii) Central Intelligence
Agency; (viii) Federal Emergency Management Agency; (ix)
Federal Bureau of Investigation; (x) National Security
Agency. See Exec. Order 13,010 at §1 (b).
139 See PCCIP REPORT, supra note 11, at 47-48.
140
See id. at 6.
141
See Executive Order 13,010 at § 4(a).
142
See id. at § 4(b) (stating that interested parties and
organizations in NII protection include those that conduct,
support infrastructure assurance, the owners and operators
of such systems and other groups, including Congress).
143
See PCCIP REPORT, supra note 15, at B-2 (describing
infrastructure protection as "Proactive risk management actions intended to prevent a threat from attempting to or succeeding at destroying or incapacitating critical infrastructures. For instance, threat deterrence and vulnerability
defense.").
144 See Exec. Ord. No. 13,010, supra note 136, at §7(a)
(stating that there was an immediate need to establish an Infrastructure Protection Task Force within the Department of
Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, in the interim, to in-
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the ability to call upon other executive branch
agencies for support should the have need
arisen. 47 This structure remained in place until
the PCCIP released its findings and recommendations in October 1997.
C.

The PCCIP Report

On October 13, 1997, the PCCIP presented its
findings to the Clinton Administration. 148 While
the Commission found no evidence that an attack
on the NII's critical components was imminent, it
did find that there was widespread capability to
exploit present weaknesses in the NII and that the
threat posed by these weaknesses was intensifying.149 Its recommendations emphasized coopera-

tion between infrastructure owners and operators,
1 50
both inside and outside of the government.
Because of the magnitude of the threat and its
evolving nature this responsibility and the effects
on the NII were deemed to be shared by all
5
groups utilizing the NIL.1 '
The findings in the PCCIP report noted that
one of the primary features of protection against
infrastructure threats to the United States, that of
geography, has become less relevant. 1 52 Due to

the ease with which computer messages can cross
international boundaries through the use of the
Internet, concepts such as early warning, jurisdictional boundaries and time to assess adversary's
crease coordination of existing infrastructure protection efforts in order to better address, and prevent, crises that
would have a debilitating regional or national impact).
145
See id.
146
The IPTF's function was to:
Identify and coordinate existing expertise, inside and
outside the Federal Government to: (i) provide, or facilitate or coordinate the provision of, expert guidance to
critical infrastructures to detect, prevent, halt, or confine attack and to recover and restore service; (ii) issue
threat and warning notices in the event advance information is obtained about a threat; (iii) provide training

and education on methods of reducing vulnerabilities
and responding to attacks on critical infrastructures; (iv)
conduct after-action analysis to determine possible future threats, targets, or methods of attack; and (v) coor-

dinate with the pertinent law enforcement authorities
during or after an attack to facilitate any resulting criminal investigation.
See id. at §7(e).
148

See id. at §7(f)-(g).
See PCCIP REPORT, supra note 15, at i.

149

See id. at 6.

15o
151

See id. at 21.
See id. at 19.
See id. at 7-8.

147

152
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actions had decreased in both scope and relevance. 153 Simulated attacks carried out during

the PCCIP's analysis of the potential for disruption of the NII revealed vulnerabilities with the
potential to cripple the continued function of the
U.S. government in times of crisis.' 54 As a result
of global integration, the report stated that the
operations of U.S. infrastructures extended well
beyond the ability of any single entity to protect
them. 155 New points of entry had been established to the critical infrastructure of the U.S.,
providing avenues of attack to adversaries abroad
1 56
as well as those located domestically.
The growing irrelevance of geography and
traditional methods of response to criminal or terrorist attacks were not the only factors considered
when examining the vulnerability of the NII. Of
particular significance to the PCCIP was that in
the past 15 years, the number of software control
specialists with the ability to disrupt the NII has
grown from only a few individuals to well over a
million worldwide. 15 7 Additionally, the ease of

availability of the programs which enable those individuals to conduct unauthorized entries into
critical control systems of the NII has spurred attempts by laypersons to achieve today what could
be achieved only by a skilled professional 10 years
ago. 1 58 The PCCIP found that while the introduc-

tion of technology based upon the NII produced
better services at lower cost by both government
and industry, dependence on the continued reliability and existence of the NII was higher the
ever.' 59 Processes used were efficient but lacked
the redundant characteristics that non-NII systems have in case of failure.'

60

In response to the issues raised by its survey of
the NII, the PCCIP findings reflected the fact that

it would disregard the infrastructure protection
approaches used during the Cold War by the federal government.1 6 1 Compartmentalization of in-

formation and the availability of long periods of
time to analyze potential threats were deemed to
162
be obsolete for the NII protection mission.
The findings contained in the report regarding
security from cyber threats stated that (1) infor16 3
mation sharing is the most immediate need;
(2) responsibility is shared among owners and operators and government; 16 4 (3) NII protection re-

quires integrated capabilities of diverse federal
agencies and special means for coordinating federal response to ensure these capabilities are
melded together effectively; 1 65 (4) the challenge
is one of adapting to a changing culture; 166 (5)
the federal government has important roles in the
new infrastructure protection alliance with industry and state and local governments; 167 (6) the existing legal framework is imperfectly attuned to
deal with cyber threats; 16 8 and (7) research and
development are not presently adequate to support infrastructure protection. 169 The conclusions reached by the PCCIP support the contention that NII protection necessitated the
establishment of a new and unique organization
which would have the flexibility and power to implement them effectively.
Presidential Decision Directives 62 and 63

D.

A comprehensive response by the Clinton Administration to the PCCIP Report was issued on
May 22, 1998 during the commencement address
at the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland. 170 During the address, President Clinton
unveiled the contents of Presidential Decision Di-

153

See id.

158

154

During the summer of 1997, the Department of De-

159

fense ran an exercise named "Eligible Receiver" to test the
ability of the U.S. military and political structure to withstand

160

See id.
See id. at 5.
See id. at 38.

161

See id. at 47-48 (stating the need for clear organiza-

a cyber-based attack. See JAMES ADAMS, THE NEXT WORLD
WAR, 187-90 (1998). The attacks focused on the NII, the military and the political leadership. The exercise utilized per-

tional structures which differ from those used by the government since World War II to create policy, assess threats and
respond to crises).

sonnel outside of the U.S. government who had no knowl-

162

edge regarding government-run NII systems. See id. In all

163

cases, the hackers were able to gain access to vital NII systems

164

and seriously disrupt the ability of the U.S. government to
function during a crisis. See id.; see also Cyber-Invaders Leave

165
166

U.S. on Brink of Darkness,DEUTSCHE

PRESSE-AGENTUR,

April 16,

155
156
157

See PCCIP

167

supra note 11, at 47-48.
See CONNECTING THE NATION, supra note 115.
See PCCIP REPORT, supra note 15, at 9.
REPORT,

id.
PCCIP REPORT, supra note 15 at 27.
id. at 35.
id. at 47.
See id. at 67.
See id. at 73.

169

See id. at 79.
See id. at 89.

170

Paul Mann, "Government/Industry Alliance Urged

168

1998, at 12.

See
See
See
See

Against Cyber Threats", Vol. 149, No. 2, AvIATION WEEK
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rectives 62171 and

63172

("PDD 62" and "PDD

63"), aimed at combating unconventional threats
to the critical infrastructures of the United
States.1 73 Based upon the recommendations of

the PCCIP, these two policy statements are the
foundation of the federal government's objective
74
of protecting the NII.1

In order to deal with the overall threat of terrorist attacks against the United States, PDD 62
discusses the missions and authorities of various
government agencies regarding counter-terrorist
programs currently underway. 17 5 The goal of the

directive is to limit the opportunities available for
attack through increased prevention activities and
create mechanisms for incident response and recovery to conventional or unconventional attacks. 17 6 The importance of this new initiative to
NII protection is found in the establishment of
the Office of the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counter-Terrorism ("National Coordinator") within the National
Security Council. 177 The role of the National Coordinator will be to oversee the implementation
of policies 78 in areas such as counter-terrorism,
protection of critical infrastructure, preparedness
SPACE TECHNOLOGY,

65 (1997).

171 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Fact
Sheet on Presidential Decision Directive 62, <http://www.
whitehouse.gov/WH/html.library.html>
(visited Nov. 22,
1998) (hereinafter "Fact Sheet on PDD 62').
172 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, The
White Paper on CriticalInfrastructureProtection: PresidentialDecision Directive 63, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/
html.library.html> (visited Nov. 22, 1998) (hereinafter "White
Paper on CriticalInfrastructureProtection").
173
The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Fact
Sheet and Summary of PresidentialDecision Directives 62 and 63
(1998) <http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/html.library.
html> (visited Nov. 22, 1998).
174
See id.
175
See Fact Sheet on PDD 62, supra note 173.
176
See id. (describing the roles of the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counter-Terrorism within the framework of the National Security Council).
177
PDD-62 establishes the Office of the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and CounterTerrorism overseeing a variety of relevant policies and programs including such areas as counter-terrorism, protection
of critical infrastructure, preparedness and consequence
management for weapons of mass destruction. See id. The
National Coordinator works within the National Security
Council, reports to the President through the Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs and produces an annual Security Preparedness Report. See id. The National Coordinator also provides advice regarding budgets for counterterrorism programs and develops of guidelines that might be
needed for crisis management. See id.

[Vol. 7

and response management in the event of the use
of a weapon of mass destruction 179 in the United
States.
As opposed to PDD 62's coverage of a wide variety of threats, PDD 63 directly describes the Clinton Administration's policy for critical NII protection. It declares that the United States shall
create an initial capability to protect the NII from
disruption by the year 2000 and that by 2002 this
capability will be transformed into an effective defense. 18 0 This critical infrastructure protection capability is to be designed to prevent disruption of
the federal government's ability to provide for national security and general health and public
safety, ensure that state and local governments are
able to maintain minimum services while also ensuring the continued availability of privately
owned parts of the critical NII.
To achieve these declared goals, PDD 63 established a four part organizational structure. First,
each part of the NII will be assigned to a "Lead
Agency" responsible for working with private parties to develop and implement a vulnerability
awareness and education program.18 1 "Lead
Agencies for Special Functions" are designated to
See id.
See also, 18 U.S.C. §2332a(c)(2) (B)-(C) (1994) (defining the term "weapon of mass destruction" as "any weapon
that is designed or intended to cause death or serious bodily
injury through the release, dissemination, or impact of toxic
or poisonous chemicals, or their precursors; or any weapon
involving a disease organism; or any weapon that is designed
to release radiation or radioactivity at a level dangerous to
human life").
180
See White Paper on Critical Infrastructure Protection, supra note 172. PDD 63 states that:
No later then the year 2000, the United States shall have
achieved an initial operating capability and no later then
five years from the day the President signed Presidential
Decision Directive 63 the United States shall have
achieved and shall maintain the ability to protect our nation's critical infrastructures from intentional acts that
would significantly diminish the abilities of: the federal
Government to perform essential national security missions and to ensure the general public health and safety;
state and local governments to maintain order and deliver minimum essential public services; the private sector to ensure the orderly functioning of the economy
and the delivery of essential telecommunications, energy, financial and transportation services.
See id.
181 For each information sector that could be a target for
significant cyber or physical attacks, a single U.S. government
department is designated to serve as Lead Agency for Sector
Liaison regarding NII issues. Together, the Lead Agency and
the private sector counterparts are to develop and implement a Vulnerability Awareness and Education Program for
their sector. See id.
178

179
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coordinate activities relating to Nil protection for
special functions which are performed exclusively
by the federal government, such as national defense and intelligence.1 8 2 Representatives of Lead
Agencies and Lead Agencies for Special Functions
meet on a regular basis under the auspices of a
Critical Infrastructure Coordination Group
("CICG"), chaired by the National Coordinator.1 8 3 Finally, a National Infrastructure Assurance Council was established.18 4 This advisory
council consists of representatives of major infrastructure providers, state and local representatives
who are to advise the CICG on matters affecting
18 5
non-federal infrastructures.
Outside of the advisory and coordination tasks
described, PDD 63 imminently authorized the
Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") to create
86
a National Infrastructure Protection Center'
("NIPC") to. provide warning of an imminent attack on the NII, building upon the work of the
IPTF.1 7 For the first time, efforts to protect the
NII have been given the ability to bring together
all parts of the civilian and military resources
available in a single organization. With elements
responsible for warning, analysis, computer investigation, coordinating emergency response, training and application of technical tools, it has a
much broader mandate to accomplish the NII
protection mission than either NTISSC or
182

Certain functions, such as national defense and for-

eign affairs, related to critical infrastructure protection are
chiefly performed by the Federal Government. See id. For
each of these special functions, there shall be a Lead Agency
for Special Function which will be responsible for coordinating all of the activities of the United States Government in
that area. See id.
183
The Sector Liaison Officials and Functional Coordinators of the Lead Agencies, as well as representatives from
other relevant departments and agencies, including the National Economic Council, will meet to coordinate the implementation of this directive under the auspices of a Critical
Infrastructure Coordination Group, chaired by the National
Coordinator. See id.
184
See id. (stating that the National Infrastructure Assurance Council is to meet periodically to enhance the partnership of the public and private sectors in protecting critical
infrastructures and will provides reports to the President).
185 See id..
186 The NIPC includes elements from the FBI, US Secret
Service, and other organizations experienced in computer
crimes and infrastructure protection, as well as representatives detailed from the Department of Defense, the intelligence community and Lead Agencies. The NIPC is linked
electronically to the rest of the federal government, including other warning and operations centers, as well as any private sector sharing and analysis centers. See id. The NIPC's
mission is to include providing timely warnings of interna-

NITA.188

IV.

PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT STATE
OF JURISDICTIONAL AND
INTERAGENCY EFFECTIVENESS IN
PROTECTING THE Nil

A.

Current Law

The current state of the law regarding protection of the Nil is defined by the Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act of 1984 (the "Act"),189 as amended
by the National Information Infrastructure Protection Act of 1996.190 Congress' amendment bypassed the traditional methods of attempting to
adapt existing laws to newly emerging offenses involving Nil protection.19 1 Additionally, because
the Nil encompasses more than federally-owned
systems, statutory construction had to encompass
unauthorized access to non-federal government
19 2
computer systems.
The need to defend against newly emerging
threats affecting NII resulted in the addition of
Section 1030, entitled "Fraud and related activity
in connection with computers."'1 3 Statutory offenses occur whenever intentional unauthorized
access takes place for the purpose of obtaining financial data,' 9 4 classified government informational threats, comprehensive analyses and law enforcement
investigation and response and includes elements responsible for warning, analysis, computer investigation, coordinating emergency response, training, outreach and development and application of technical tools. See id.
187
See Exec. Ord. No. 13,010, supra note 136, at §7 (stating that the NIPC consists of members from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Secret Service, the Department of
Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the Lead Agencies).
188 See NSD 42, supra note 101 (describing the NTISSC's
primary goal of protecting the DII); see CONNECTING THE NATION, supra note 114, (describing NTIA's mandate to increase
access to the NIl, as opposed to increasing its security).
189
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, Pub. L. 10173, codified as 18 U.S.C. §1030 (1994).
lOO National Information Infrastructure Protection Act
of 1996, Pub. L. 105-175, -Stat. -, (1998).
191 See Sheri A. Dillon, et. al., Computer Crimes, 35 AM.
CRIM. L. REv. 503, 508 (1998).
192
See generally Jo-Ann M. Adams, Comment, Controlling
Cyberspace: Applying the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act to the Internet, 12 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. LJ. 403, 41920 (1996) (describing the need for more elaborate government regulation of the uses of the Internet).
193 See generally 18 U.S.C. §1030 (regarding fraud and related activity in connection with computers).
194
See 18 U.S.C. §1030(a) (4).
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tion' 95 or any information from "any protected
computer involved in interstate or foreign communication."' 9 6 Unauthorized access to a computer system that affects its use by the federal government, even if that system is owned by another
entity, is also addressed.' 9 7 By using the phrase
"protected computer"19 8 to describe non-federally
owned computer systems that are involved in interstate commerce or affect the operation of federally owned computer systems, the statute goes

further than previous Nil-related statutes. 9 9 This
language was added by the National Information
Infrastructure Protection Act of 1996 to protect
any computer involved in Internet-related activities. 20 0 Jurisdiction under the statute is thus always federal because of subject matter jurisdiction, eliminating problems associated with the
application of state laws which may provide deficiencies in scope or are lacking in specificity to
computer based crimes. 20 ' The National Information Infrastructure Protection Act of 1996 thus
closes many significant gaps in previous statutes
which served to hinder NII protection.
The statute also applies to acts committed by
persons who obtain authorized access or exceed
their authorized authority to access Nil systems. 20 2 It criminalizes the transmission or insertion of a program or command into a protected
computer with the intent to cause damage. 20 3 Additionally, the use of such a command or program
to defraud another party is a violation, regardless
20 4
of whether damage is done to the system.

Access issues such as those addressed by the Act
and its amendment in 1996 reflect the Second
See 18 U.S.C. §1030(a)(2)(B).
See 18 U.S.C. §1030(a)(2)(C).
197 See 18 U.S.C. §1030(e) (2) (A)
198 See 18 U.S.C. §1030(e) (2) (A)-(B) (stating that as used
in this section the term protected computer refers to "a computer exclusively for use of a financial institution or the U.S.
Government, or, in the case of a computer not exclusively for
such use, used by or for a financial institution or the U.S.
Government and the conduct constituting the offense affects
that use by or for the financial institution or the Government
or which is used in interstate, foreign commerce or communication").
199 See Dillon, supra note 191, at 508-09.
200
See id.
201
See generally Gwenn M. Kalow, Note, From the Internet to
Court: Exercising Jurisdiction Over World Wide Web Communications, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 2241, 2253-56 (1997) (discussing
personal jurisdiction analyses relevant to the Internet).
202 See 18 U.S.C. §1030 (a)(5).
203
See 18 U.S.C. §1030(a) (5) (A).
204 See 18 U.S.C. §1030 (a) (2) (B)-(C).
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Circuit's decision in United States v. Monis.20 5 In
Morris, the defendant, a doctrinal candidate at
Cornell University, released a virus into the NII
which eventually affected numerous installations,
including military sites.20 6 The defendant argued
that the Act was inapplicable because he had access to the system and was therefore outside the
scope of the statute. 20 7 The Second Circuit rejected this statutory construction, finding that the
legislative history of the Act showed that Congress
did not intend to differentiate between unauthor20 8
ized access and access that exceeds authority.
However, in its application of this construction,
the Court in Morris noted that the defense was not
entirely without merit because there had been no
20 9
firm statement by Congress on the subject.
This ambiguity was remedied by the National Information Infrastructure Protection Act of
1996.210

In addition to the National Information Infrastructure Protection Act, other federal laws exist
which enforcement officials can invoke to protect
the NII. The National Stolen Property Act 2 11, and
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act2 12 are
useful tools in this area of law enforcement. The
National Stolen Property Act prohibits the transportation in interstate commerce of goods worth
more than $5,000 which have been stolen or
fraudulently obtained.2 1 3 The use of this statute
in protecting the NII relates to cases involving
fraudulent transfer of funds or goods obtained
214
through manipulation of a computer system.
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act,
passed in 1986, created prohibitions regarding

209

928 F.2d 504 ( 2 "d Cir. 1991).
See id. at 505-6.
See id. at 508-10.
See id. at 511.
See id.

210

18 U.S.C. §1030(a)(5)(A).

195

205

196

206
207
208

(allowing for criminal

penalties for whoever, having knowingly accessed a computer
without authorization or exceeding authorized access knowingly causes the transmission of a program, information,
code, or command, and as a result of such conduct, inten-

tionally causes damage to a protected computer shall be
guilty of a felony).
211
See National Stolen Property Act, 18 U.S.C. §2314
(1994).

212
See Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C.
§§2510-2521, 2701-2710 (1994).
213
See 18 U.S.C. §2314 (describing application of the National Stolen Property Act to fraudulent transfer of funds or
goods obtained through manipulation of a computer system).
214
See id.
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the interception of wire and electronic communications and can be interpreted to extend to e-mail
and Internet communications transmitted over
the PSTN. 2 15 Both statutes therefore enhance the

effectiveness of the National Information Infrastructure Protection Act because prosecutors are
provided additional tools to assist them in NII
protection roles.
B.

Federal Agency Jurisdiction

In evaluating the federal government's ability
to prosecute acts which disrupt the security of the
NII, it is necessary to examine the ability of individual federal agencies to exercise jurisdiction.
The creation of numerous advisory committees,
task forces and public-private commissions complicates the examination of agency roles in NII
protection. An obvious choice for enforcement of
statutes relating to the NII is the Department of
Justice ("DOJ"), however, there are many other
organizations that possess resources and responsibilities mandated by statute, Executive Order or
simply institutional experience with information
infrastructures. Foremost among these organizations is the Department of Defense ("DOD").
The DOD has accumulated vast experience in
dealing with intruders into its information infrastructure because of its elaborate security precautions and the sheer size of its system. 2 16 This abil-

ity, however, is circumscribed by the limitations
placed upon the armed forces through statutes
providing that they not be used as posse comitatus. 2 17

As a result, the DOD is forced to act in a

supporting role regarding NII protection. Other
organizations with the capability to assist in
preventing attacks on the NII, such as the Central
215

18 U.S.C. §2511(1)(e).

216

See Hanseman, supra note 29, at 192-93.

See Use of Army and Air Force as posse comitatus, 18
U.S.C. §1385 (1994) (stating that whoever, except in cases
and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army
or Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the
laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned note more
then two years, or both); see also, Naval Instruction 5820.7
(1975) (Extending 18 U.S.C. §1385 to the use of the Navy
217

and Marines as posse comitatus); see also BLACKS LAw DICTION1162 (6th ed. 1990) (defining posse comitatus as the entire
population of a county above the age of fifteen, which the
sheriff may summon in certain cases, as to aid him in keeping
the peace, in pursuing and arresting felons, etc.).
218
See 50 U.S.C. §403(d)(3) (1994) (stating that the

ARY

Central Intelligence Agency shall have no police, subpoena,

Intelligence Agency and the National Security
2 18
Council are barred from domestic operations
and are unable to act independently of the DOJ
in preventing such activities. This is true even if
the individual responsible is later found to be located in a foreign country. 2 19 While limiting the
activities of the armed forces and intelligence
agencies in law enforcement area is a sound national policy, it does not equate with the roles that
these organizations have been given with regard
to the Nil.
Prior to the promulgation of PDD 62 and 63,
the lines between law enforcement and national
security functions in the NII was clearly drawn.
The Commerce Department's NTIA organization
conducted liaisons with private owners and operators within the NII, while the NTISSC coordinated
military and intelligence efforts. Adoption of the
PCCIP's recommendations blurred these two areas of NII protection. The result was the creation
of an organization which, while operationally located within the DOJ, contains military and intelligence personnel and utilizes them in a law enforcement capacity, namely, investigating
intrusions into civilian NII systems and reporting
220
to a member of the National Security Council.
Furthermore, some of the designated Lead Agencies, such as the Department of Energy and the
Department of State, have little or no capability of
their own to conduct effective computer-based
NII protection due to a lack of institutional knowledge of the subject. 22 1 The significance of this ac-

tion was to create an organization that is not as
effective as its predecessors because it concentrates on inter-agency participation rather than
working with the owners and operators to respond quickly and effectively to threats to the NIl.
law-enforcement powers, or internal security functions).
219
220
221

See id.
See Fact Sheet on PDD 62, supra note 173.
See generally, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,

DEPART-

MENT OF ENERGY: PROCEDURES LACKING TO PROTECT COMPUT-

Rep. No. GAO/AIMD-95-118 (1995) (describing an incident in 1993-94 during which the Department of
Energy discarded between 25 and 50 personal computers
which contained classified data and concludes that the Department of Energy continues to adequately safeguard sensitive information on its computer systems); see General Accounting Office, Computer Security: Pervasive, Serious
Weaknesses Jeopardize State Department Operations, Rep.
No. GAO/AIMD-98-145, at 6 (1998) (charging that the Department of State lacks a comprehensive information security
program).
ERIZED DATA,
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C.

Proposed Nil Protection Organization

The establishment of the CICG, the NIPC and a
National Coordinator for NI protection is an important step in creating an awareness both inside
and outside of government of the necessity of NII
protection. 2 22 Awareness, however, is only the
first step in undertaking such an endeavor. A fundamental problem with the newly established
framework is that in attempting to solve the dilemma of NII security, it creates new ones. Foremost among these is the decentralization of authority associated with the Lead Agencies
concept. The CICG policy-making procedure requires the input of these agencies in formulating
new policies and proposed legislation on the
NII. 223 This structure is therefore susceptible to

the differing interests of its participants regarding
methods to be employed, resources to be allocated, and to the individual agendas of each
agency involved.
Additionally, private industry has been reluctant to become involved. 224 PDD 63 calls for the
establishment of an Information Sharing and
Analysis Center ("ISAC") made up of private owners and operators of the NII.22 5 In theory, this coordination between the NIPC and the private sector is an excellent opportunity to create policy
and provide a forum for participation associated
with NII protection for groups outside the govern222

See PCCIP

REPORT,

supra note 11, at 24 (stating the

importance of establishing mechanisms to protect the NII).
223
See White Paperon CriticalInfrastructureProtection,supra
note 172 (describing the membership of the Critical Infrastructure Coordination Group).
224
See The Role of Computer Security in Protecting U.S. Infrastructures:HearingBefore the House Comm. on Science, Subcommittee on Technology, 1 0 5 h Cong. 28, 31 (1998) (statement of Russell B. Stevenson, General Counsel, CyberCash, Inc.) (stating
that Congress should limit the role of government to (1) research and education aimed at enabling private actors to protect their interests more effectively and (2) identifying and
addressing those weaknesses in the electronic infrastructure
as a whole that cannot be effectively addressed by the private
sector).
225
See White Paperon Critical InfrastructureProtection, supra
note 172 (stating that in operating the Information Sharing
and Analysis Center the National Coordinator shall consult
with owners and operators of the critical infrastructures to
strongly encourage the creation of a private sector information sharing and analysis center with the actual design and
functions of the center and its relation to the NIPC determined by the private sector, in consultation with from the
federal government).
226

See PCCIP

REPORT,

supra note 11, at 31-32 (discussing

legal impediments to information sharing by the public sector with Lead Agencies).
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ment. The reality is that not only is there a reluctance in the private sector for sharing information
among competitors that may erode public confidence should a successful attack occur, the Lead
Agencies associated with the ISAC have regulatory
authority over the industries with which they are
to cooperate. 226 In establishing the ISAC concept, the Clinton Administration did not follow
through on the PCCIP recommendation that
some mechanism be put into place to safeguard
proprietary information supplied by private owners and operators.2 27 Release of potentially damaging information to an industry affected by a
breakdown in part of the NII could lead to calls
for more stringent regulation or sanction from
the very agency which is supposed to be cooperat228
ing with the affected industry.
Regarding the role of the federal government,
questions can be raised about the effectiveness of
the CICG and NIPC regarding intelligence and
dissemination of information. PDD 63 states that
prior to the distribution of law enforcement and
intelligence information the NIPC will "sanitize"
the release to eliminate any sensitive national security data. 229

Additionally, coordination

be-

tween the National Coordinator and the NIPC is
mandatory prior to the release of any public warnings of attacks by internationally based threats to

227
The drafters of the PCCIP Report envisioned the creation of an environment that would allow the government
and private sector to share information openly and voluntarily. See PCCIP REPORT, supra note 11, at 31. Success, according to the authors, depends on the ability to protect the NII
as well as disseminate needed information regarding threats.
See id. To accomplish this they proposed altering several
legal provisions that discourage participation in areas such as
antitrust, intellectual property and privacy. See id.
228
The PCCIP Report specifically mentions the need for
assurances by the federal government that information provided by private organizations in any information sharing regime be given limited assurances that it will not be used
against the providers. See id. at 31-33. Areas in which these
assurances should be given according to report include antitrust, liability, trade secrets and other confidential business
information. See id. PDD 63 does not address these issues and
therefore does not remove any of the previously existing impediments to information sharing which necessitated its promulgation. See id.
229
See White Paper on Critical Infrastructure Protection,
supra note 172 (stating that prior to the release of information, the NIPC, in conjunction with the intelligence community, will sanitize information for inclusion into analyses and
reports that it will provide federal, state and local agencies,
owners and operators of critical infrastructures and to any
private sector information sharing and analysis center).

Under Siege

1999]

the NII. 23 0 There are two areas where these types
of security measures fall short.
First, by limiting intelligence information to
.data deemed to be non-threatening to national security, the threat to the NII increases because incomplete information is disseminated.2 31 This incomplete information can create vulnerabilities
because the affected portion of the NII may not
either appreciate the magnitude of the threat or
take incorrect precautions in response.
Second, the requirement of consultation with
the National Coordinator may have the effect of
slowing the process to the point of rendering a
warning system ineffective. 232 Information on the
Internet can be generated in the United States,
sent to an intermediate foreign destination, and
then routed back to the United States attack the
NII. 233 There is no clear distinction between
threats from within the United States and those
originating from overseas, the capabilities and the
will to act exist in both places.2 34 Because of the
anonymity associated with the Internet, 235 the
sender of an attack on the NII can be anyone
from a stereotypical terrorist organization in the
Middle East, to a disgruntled computer programmer in Germany to a teenager in Basking Ridge,
New Jersey. There is no readily ascertainable way
to discover the true identity of an attacker until
after a period of investigation, by which time the
attack is over and the perpetrator may be reading
236
about the results in the New York Times.
The DOJ is the only agency with the capabilities
to effectively engage in both a law enforcement
and investigatory role without becoming involved
with regulatory oversight questions. Prior to the
introduction of the restructuring associated with
PDD 63, the FBI operated the IPTF using DOJ
personnel with the PCCIP acting in an advisory
role. 23 7 This centralization of NII protection
230
See id. (stating that except in extreme circumstances,
the NIPC shall coordinate with the National Coordinator
before issuing public warnings of imminent attacks by international terrorists, foreign states, or other malevolent foreign

powers).
231
See Molander, supra note 14. at 26 (describing the decreased effectiveness of previously utilized methods of intelligence gathering and the difficulties in disseminating the information that is gathered).

232

See White Paper on Critical Infrastructure Protection,

supra note 172.
233 See supra text sections II(A) and II(B) (1) (describing
the operation of the Internet).

within one agency can serve to decrease interagency problems which may arise in the context
of computer-based attacks because of confusion
over which is to take the lead in responding. Furthermore, appropriations for NII protection can
be assigned to one specific entity, resulting in a
greater impact on operations. The Lead Agencies
concept can also work within this structure. By assigning specialists to the FBI-based organization,
the knowledge base necessary to understand the
problems associated with private industry can be
viewed from a technical, as opposed to a regulatory, perspective. 238 Defense and intelligence organizations should also be represented, although
only in an advisory capacity to share relevant and
uncensored intelligence with FBI personnel. This
change in mandate requires that the NTISSC
should be designated the primary organization
for parts of the NII involving national security
computer systems on an equal status with the FBI
organization. In this role, the permanent assignment of FBI personnel to operate in law enforcement rules should be contemplated to act upon
information gathered by NTISSC when national
security computer systems are involved.
The National Coordinator, the Clinton Administration's answer to the PCCIP's call for a coordinated NII protection policy, should be retained in
its current role and given the task of coordination
between the operational entities at the FBI and
NTISSC and the National Security Counsel. This
allows the Coordinator to formulate overall policy, freeing personnel directly involved with investigations and enforcement to play their role as
protectors of the NII instead of being delegated
the responsibility to meet with an ever-expanding
number of advisory committees to debate future
legislation.

234
See Morth, supra note 29, at 571 (discussing information warfare); see Rep. No. GAO/T-AIMD-96-108, supra note
133 at 2 (discussing the motivations of hackers).
235
See Reno, supra note 59, at 2334-35 (discussing the
anominity cyberspace).
236
See generally Amy Harmon, Hacker Group Commandeers
Times Web Site, N.Y. TIMES, September 14, 1998, at A10
(describing the Sept. 13, 1998 disruption of the New York
Times website by hackers).
237
See Exec. Ord. No. 13,010, supra note 135, at §7(a),
(e) (describing the operation and roles of the IPTF).
238
See PCCIP Report, supra note 15, at 31-34.
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V.

CONCLUSION

The current structure of NII protection lacks
the ability to overcome the possibility of jurisdictional and interagency based problems. The
agencies with the best capabilities for detection
and response to threats assigned to NII protection
are unable to effectively respond due to institutional weaknesses in NII protection or, as in the
case of the DOD, are likely barred by statute from
doing so. The only proper solution is to return to
the bifurcation between civilian and military NII
protection that existed prior to PDD 62 and 63.
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The NTISSC should work with the defense and intelligence related NII systems and the FBI should
assume responsibility for all private and non-defense related government NII components while
providing law enforcement capability to the
NTISSC. The current laws in place are flexible
enough to allow for effective NII protection today.
However, without a clear organizational structure,
the NII's vulnerability will undoubtedly increase
because of jurisdictional and interagency disputes.

